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Lewis v. Clarke, 135 A.3d 677 (Conn. 2016)
Lillian M. Alvernaz
The nation to nation relationship between tribes and the federal
government is unique. Within that relationship, the federal government
acknowledges and respects tribal sovereignty. An important aspect of
sovereignty is sovereign immunity. Lewis v. Clarke confronts the
applicability of sovereign immunity through an extension of tribal
sovereignty over an employee defendant.1 After having heard oral
argument, the United States Supreme Court could either reaffirm or
severely limit the applicability of tribal sovereign immunity to “arms” of
a tribe.2 While the lower court analyzed tribal sovereign immunity by
considering the damages sought, the Supreme Court opinion portends to
extend far beyond just this negligence claim.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Reversing the lower court’s analysis, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut extended tribal sovereign immunity to an individual
defendant employed by the tribe, rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to seek
damages against the defendant in an individual capacity.4 While driving a
vehicle on behalf of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (“MTGA”),
the defendant collided with the plaintiff’s car, injuring the plaintiffs.5 Both
parties agree that the MTGA is an arm of the Tribe.6 In an attempt to
bypass tribal sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs assert that by naming the
defendant in an individual capacity and seeking damages in such capacity,
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity does not reach the defendant.7 In
response, the defendant asserts he was acting within the scope of his
employment and his employer is an “arm” of the tribe, thereby extending
tribal sovereign immunity over his action.8
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is well established.9 It
is a long acknowledged principle that the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity encompasses individual “tribal officials” who act in their
“representative capacity and within the scope of their authority.”10 Only
when a tribal official acts outside, or beyond, the scope of their authority
1.
Lewis v. Clarke (Clarke I), 135 A.3d 677 (Conn. 2016).
2.
Lewis v. Clarke (Clarke II), 132 S. Ct. 416 (2016).
3.
Clarke I, 135 A.3d at 678.
4.
Id. at 685.
5.
Id. at 678.
6.
Id. at 680.
7.
Id. at 679.
8.
Id. at 680.
9.
Id. at 682 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986)).
10.
Id. at 683 (quoting Romanella v. Hayward, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir.
1997)).

2

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 0

to act on behalf of the tribe,11 will the court consider a claim against a tribal
official in an individual capacity.12
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument limiting tribal
sovereign immunity for damages sought from the defendant in his
individual capacity.13 The defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court of
Connecticut reversed.14 Plaintiffs, now petitioners, successfully petitioned
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.15
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 22, 2011, the plaintiffs were traveling southbound on
Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut.16 The defendant was following the
plaintiffs in a limousine owned by the MTGA.17 While following the
plaintiffs, the defendant unexpectedly drove the limousine into the rear
end of the plaintiffs’ vehicle, causing their vehicle to crash and come to
rest on the concrete highway barrier.18 The plaintiffs were injured.19 Both
the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs and the wreck itself were negligently
caused by the defendant.20
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant claiming
their injuries from the collision were due to the defendant’s negligence and
carelessness.21 The defendant motioned to dismiss the complaint and
asserted the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
doctrine of tribal immunity extended to protect him from liability.22 The
defendant also filed an affidavit from the MTGA director of transportation,
Michael Hamilton, to support his motion.23
The plaintiffs disagreed with the defendant’s motion and claimed
tribal sovereign immunity did not extend to the defendant’s actions.24
Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction because the defendant was named in his individual capacity
and damages were sought against him, not the tribe.25 The trial court
11.
Id. (quoting Basset Mashantucket Pequot Museum & Research
Center, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280 (D. Conn 2002); see Garcia v. Akwesasne
Housing Authority, 105 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that an
individual capacity claim against a tribal official claim may proceed if the tribal
official acted outside their scope of delegated authority)).
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at 677.
14.
Id.
15.
Clarke II, 137 S. Ct. 416.
16.
Clarke I, 135 A.3d. at 678.
17.
Id. at 679.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
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subsequently denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and found it had
jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because the
plaintiffs’ claims sought money damages against the defendant in his
individual capacity, not from the MTGA.26
The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss.27 The defendant asserted the trial court
improperly denied extending tribal sovereign immunity.28 Further, the
defendant asserted: (1) he was acting within the scope of his employment
with the MTGA, an arm of the Mohegan Tribe; and (2) tribal sovereign
immunity prohibits the plaintiffs’ claims against him.29
Plaintiffs contended the trial court was correct to deny the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.30 The plaintiffs specifically asserted that
the remedy sought would not affect the tribe because the damages were
sought against the defendant in his individual capacity. 31 The plaintiffs
further alleged tribal sovereign immunity should not reach their claim and
deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.32
The Supreme Court of Connecticut found the undisputed facts to
show the defendant was an employee of the tribe and was acting within
his scope of employment when the collision occurred.33 Thus, the Court
concluded that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity reached the
plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant.34 The Court agreed with the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut’s determination
that the plaintiffs may not avoid the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
by naming the tribal employee defendant in an individual capacity when
he was acting within the scope of his employment.35 The Court held the
trial court’s finding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity did not
reach the defendant’s actions was an improper determination.36 Thus, the
Court found the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs complaint improper.37 The Court reversed the lower court’s
judgment and remanded with instruction to grant the defendant’s motion
to dismiss.38 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted the
plaintiff’s petition for certiorari.39
III. ANALYSIS

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 686.
Id.
Clarke II, 137 S. Ct. 416.
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A. Trial Court’s Denial of the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Generally, denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final judgment
that may be appealed because it is an interlocutory ruling.40 Though, when
the denial of a motion to dismiss contains a colorable claim of sovereign
immunity, such action is an immediately appealable final judgment
“because the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that
further proceedings cannot affect them.”41 Further, a motion to dismiss
based on tribal sovereign immunity, filed by tribal employees, is a final
judgment for purposes of an appeal.42 Here, the defendant’s motion was
final because of the tribal sovereign immunity claim.43 The Supreme Court
of Connecticut found the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss
appealable.44
B. Trial Court’s Dismissal of Jurisdictional Challenge
Since the defendant’s appeal was proper, the Court then examined
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.45 Defendant asserted that the
plaintiffs’ claims were prohibited because the defendant was acting within
the scope of his employment for the Mohegan Tribe when the incident
occurred.46 The defendant further contended that the Court should grant
his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the tribal
sovereign immunity implicated from his employment with the Mohegan
Tribe.47 The Court’s standard of review is de novo because of the review
of the lower court’s “ultimate legal conclusion.”48
Prior to the defendant filing his motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
dropped the MTGA as a defendant.49 The Supreme Court of Connecticut
found that the only issue for the trial court to decide regarding the motion
to dismiss, was whether the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity
prohibited the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant in his individual
capacity.50
C. Sovereign Immunity is Foundational for Tribal Sovereignty

40.
Clarke I, 135 A.3d at 680 (quoting Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 A.2d
128 (Conn. 2007)).
41.
Id. (quoting Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 A.2d 128 (Conn. 2007)).
42.
Id. (citing Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc. 260 A.2d 498
(Conn. 2002)).
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. (citing Bloom v. Gershon, 856 A.2d 335 (Conn. 2004) (A
determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law)).
48.
Id. (quoting Gold v. Rowland, 994 A.2d 106 (Conn. 2010)).
49.
Id. at 682.
50.
Id.
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Immunity from suit enjoyed by sovereign entities is among the
“core aspects of sovereignty that tribes possess.”51 Tribes exercise inherent
sovereign authority as domestic dependent nations.52 As dependent
nations, tribes are subject to Congressional plenary authority.53 At the
same time, tribes “remain separate sovereigns [preexisting] the
[c]onstitution.”54 For that reason, “unless and until” Congress specifically
acts, tribes retain their inherent authority as sovereigns.55
Immunity from suit is necessary and essential to tribal sovereignty
and self-governance.56 Due to Congress’s plenary power over Indian
affairs, a tribe’s immunity rests in Congress’s hands.57 Because of this,
unless Congress specifically expresses an abrogation of such immunity,
“courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine
Indian self-government.”58
D. The Defendant was Acting Within the Scope of His Employment
A tribal official is only “stripped” of tribal authority, and thus
tribal immunity, when the officer acts “manifestly or palpably beyond his
authority.”59 However, tribal sovereign immunity does extend to
individual employees acting within the scope of their employment.60 Thus,
plaintiffs may not avoid tribal sovereign immunity by naming tribal
employees individually for actions by defendants in such capacities.61
The plaintiffs do not dispute the defendant was employed by the
MTGA.62 Further, the plaintiffs presented no evidence establishing the
defendant’s actions as outside the scope of his employment at the time of
the collision.63 The Supreme Court of Connecticut looked to these
undisputed facts and found that the defendant was acting within the scope
of his employment when he wrecked into the plaintiffs and injured them.64
51.
Id. at 681 (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation, 476 U.S. at 877).
52.
Id. (citing Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991)).
53.
Id. (see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (the constitution
grants Congress powers we have consistently described as plenary and exclusive to
legislate in respect to Indian tribes)).
54.
Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56
(1978).
55.
Id. (see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
56.
Id. at 682 (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation, 476 U.S. at 877).
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 683 (quoting Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Museum &
Research Center, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 280 (2002)).
60.
Id. at 682 (citing Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, Inc. 260 A.2d
498 (Conn. 2002)).
61.
Id. (citing Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F. 3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2004)).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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Because the defendant was an employee, acting within the scope of his
employment, he is afforded tribal sovereign immunity regardless of the
suit being brought against him in his individual capacity.65 The Court
upheld this interpretation of the law.66
IV. CONCLUSION
Lewis v. Clarke is a crucial decision in federal Indian law
regarding tribal sovereignty. Because of the nature of federal Indian law,
tribes across the nation will be influenced by this tribal sovereign
immunity determination. In the era of self-determination, Clarke will
serve to either undermine the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity or
further entrench the long-standing doctrine as a fundamental aspect of
tribal sovereignty.

65.
66.

Id.
Id.

